Athens developed its democracy through more than a century of disputes over who should govern the city. By the late sixth century BCE, its citizens had begun to exercise authority through an assembly and a council no longer reserved for a few aristocratic families. In the fifth century, thousands of men could vote on peace and war, hold public office and decide cases in court. Citizens therefore held unusually direct political authority, while most people living in Athens remained excluded.
The changes began well before Athens became the great naval power of classical Greece. Solon’s reforms in 594/3 BCE addressed divisions within the community; Cleisthenes reshaped its political organisation in 508/7 BCE. Ephialtes and Pericles later helped extend the influence of ordinary male citizens in the law courts and administration. Oligarchs overthrew the democracy in 411 and again in 404 BCE, and Athenians restored it after each coup. In 322 BCE, defeat by Macedon ended the independence of the classical democratic state.
The reforms became a working political system through local membership registers, rotating council duties, juries chosen by lot and written laws. Together these allowed a large citizen body to make decisions and hold officials accountable. The city’s navy and the revenue of its empire helped sustain that system, while also creating strains that became harder to manage during the Peloponnesian War. Military defeat gave organised oligarchic groups the openings they needed. The democrats’ subsequent returns to power brought a sharper concern with reconciliation and rules that could be enforced even during political conflict.
Solon and the crisis of debt in early Athens
Athens was the main city of Attica, the region of southeastern Greece that included the surrounding villages and countryside. In the seventh and early sixth centuries BCE, leading aristocratic families monopolised the highest offices. At the same time, conflict over land, debt and personal dependence threatened to divide the community. We know about this crisis mainly through later writers and poems attributed to Solon, the man asked to address it. The sources agree that Athenians faced serious internal divisions, but they do not establish a single legal status for all debtors, tenants or dependent farmers. Their circumstances must be distinguished rather than treating the whole poorer population as one group.
In 594/3 BCE Solon was made archon, one of Athens’ chief magistrates, and given exceptional authority to find a settlement. The ancient Constitution of the Athenians, traditionally associated with Aristotle’s school says that his seisachtheia, or “shaking off of burdens,” cancelled debts and prohibited loans in which the borrower pledged his own person as security. These measures were closely tied to freeing Athenians from servitude. In Solon’s verse preserved in the ancient constitutional account, the reformer speaks of lifting markers from the land and bringing back people who had been sold abroad. His language conveys the scale of the grievances he meant to address, even where the precise workings of earlier debt arrangements remain difficult to recover.
Those land markers, or horoi, cannot simply be identified with stones found by archaeologists. Solon uses them in his poem as signs of burdens on the land, but no surviving boundary marker has been securely linked to his reforms. The inscribed mortgage stones known from classical Athens mostly belong to a later way of securing property obligations. This chronological problem is discussed in Horoi: Studies in Mortgage, Real Security, and Land Tenure in Ancient Athens. A fourth-century marker can illuminate later Athenian practice; it cannot by itself show exactly how indebted farmers were treated in the seventh century BCE.
Historians also disagree over how far Solon’s legislation went. A common reading of the ancient testimony is that he ended debt bondage. Edward Harris draws a narrower distinction: in his interpretation, the prohibition on pledging one’s person stopped enslavement for debt but did not necessarily end other forms of dependent labour. He develops that position in “Did Solon Abolish Debt-Bondage?”. Both interpretations start from evidence that leaves important questions unresolved. Solon’s intervention plainly addressed a grave political and social problem, and at minimum restricted a way in which a citizen could lose his freedom through debt.
Solon introduced a further change by sorting citizens into four property classes: the pentakosiomedimnoi, hippeis, zeugitai and thetes. Access to prestigious magistracies still depended on property, particularly excluding men in the poorest class, but descent from an aristocratic family was no longer the sole basis of political rank. Later constitutional tradition also credits Solon with improving access to legal remedies and permitting appeals against magistrates before larger citizen juries. It attributes a Council of Four Hundred to him as well, although scholars do not agree about its original duties. Solon had weakened the hold of hereditary privilege while retaining important property distinctions. The democracy familiar from the fifth century emerged generations after his lifetime.
Why the Peisistratid tyranny did not end political reform
Solon’s settlement did not lead straight to popular government. In the middle of the sixth century BCE, Peisistratos, an ambitious politician with popular backing, gained personal power and secured a lasting position as tyrant around 546 BCE. The Greek word tyrannos described a ruler whose exceptional authority did not rest on the usual hereditary claim of a king. It was a political designation, not proof that every act of his government was cruel. What distinguished the tyrant was his ability to exercise power beyond the normal struggle for civic offices.
Peisistratos continued to use the city’s established institutions while reserving decisive influence for himself and his family. His sons maintained that arrangement after his death in 527 BCE. Ancient literary accounts associate their rule with festivals, building works and Athens’ growing regional importance, although particular projects are not always securely dated. By 510 BCE opposition inside Athens, assisted by Cleomenes I, a king of Sparta, drove out Hippias, the son who had become the dynasty’s leading figure. The tyranny was over, but the question of succession remained. Competing aristocratic groups now sought control of the institutions Peisistratos had left in place.
Cleisthenes and the creation of a new citizen body
The rivalry after Hippias’ expulsion centred on two aristocrats, Isagoras and Cleisthenes. Cleisthenes came from the influential Alcmaeonid family and was himself an established participant in elite politics. After Isagoras gained the advantage, Cleisthenes appealed to a wider body of Athenians. Isagoras sought help from King Cleomenes and Spartan troops. According to the Constitution of the Athenians, chapter 20, an effort to establish a more restricted government met resistance from the existing council and the population at large. Cleisthenes was brought back. Popular opposition to Spartan-backed intervention helped determine who could now remake the political order.
In 508/7 BCE Cleisthenes changed the basis on which Athenians belonged to their state. Civic membership was registered in a deme, a local district that might be a village or a neighbourhood of the city, and that district became part of a citizen’s official identity. The arrangement placed territorial membership alongside, and in political administration ahead of, older family and kinship ties. Aristocratic influence had often depended on established loyalties within particular districts. By reorganising those connections, Cleisthenes brought men from distant parts of Attica into institutions where they had to act together.
The districts were organised into thirty larger divisions, called trittyes. Ten came from Athens and its immediate surroundings, ten from the coast and ten from inland Attica. Cleisthenes then formed ten tribes, each with a division from all three areas. Aristotle’s description in chapter 21 explains the intention as mixing the citizen body and enlarging participation. Wealthy families did not lose their resources or influence overnight. By including citizens from three different parts of Attica, each tribe was harder for one local aristocratic network to dominate.
Each of the ten tribes sent fifty members to a new Council of Five Hundred, the boule. The council prepared business for the assembly and handled administrative decisions that could not await a meeting of the whole citizen body. Fifty councillors at a time, the prytaneis, performed rotating duties for part of the year. Our most detailed account of these procedures describes the fourth-century system, after many changes had been made; it would be wrong to assume Cleisthenes introduced every later rule in exactly that form in 508 BCE. The broader achievement of the tribal structure and council was practical: citizens across Attica now had a workable means of sharing public responsibility.
Cleisthenes acted amid a contest between aristocratic rivals. He faced an attempt to impose power with Spartan help and found support among ordinary Athenians who resisted it. Athens also needed institutions capable of coordinating communities spread across a substantial territory. The settlement that emerged linked local civic identity to government exercised on behalf of Attica as a whole.
How the assembly, council and courts governed Athens
At the centre of the democracy stood the citizen assembly, the ekklesia. Adult male citizens could attend, speak and vote, and in the classical period they usually met on the Pnyx, the hill west of the Acropolis large enough to hold thousands of people. Votes were normally taken by a show of hands. Military campaigns, peace agreements, public expenditure and elections to certain offices all came before this gathering. Unlike a representative parliament, the assembly allowed eligible citizens to decide many matters directly. Not every citizen attended every meeting, and the council prepared much of the business on which they voted.

The diagram above reconstructs the Pnyx as it may have appeared around 326 BCE. That is more than 180 years after Cleisthenes’ reforms. The reconstruction depicts the later assembly ground. It cannot establish how Athenians assembled in 508 BCE.
Attendance at the assembly had a place in Athenian comedy as well as politics. In Aristophanes’ Acharnians, citizens try to avoid a red-dyed rope used to herd them from the Agora to the meeting. The scene is memorable, but a comic joke cannot establish that every Athenian was compelled to attend every session. By the fourth century, the state also paid modest sums to encourage participation. A requirement for six thousand citizens applied to certain special decisions, not as an unchanging quorum for all assembly business.
The assembly depended on the daily work of the boule. Councillors drew up proposals, dealt with visiting delegations and oversaw officials. By the fourth century, one presiding councillor served for a single day and night and held the city’s seal and specified keys; other chairmen were separately chosen to conduct meetings. Rotating these responsibilities prevented any one officer from keeping them indefinitely. It also meant that citizens who earned a living through farming, crafts or other work had to find time for substantial public duties.
For the council and many magistracies, Athenians used sortition, the selection of officials by lot. They elected generals and holders of certain specialised posts, where particular skills were considered necessary. Appointment did not remove scrutiny: a candidate might undergo the preliminary examination called dokimasia, and officials faced subsequent reviews of their conduct and accounts, known as euthynai. The intention was to let citizens examine the use of public authority before and after service. Neither random selection nor these reviews eliminated favouritism, corruption or political rivalry.
The popular courts provided another route into public decision-making. In the fourth century BCE, men generally had to be over thirty to serve as jurors, and a panel might contain several hundred citizens. Litigants and their advocates argued cases without the permanent professional judges familiar in many modern legal systems; the jurors themselves cast the votes. Because court cases could test the conduct and legality of officials’ actions, the people exercised considerable power beyond the decisions they made in the assembly.
Ephialtes, Pericles and the widening of democratic power
The reforms of Cleisthenes left some established centres of aristocratic authority in place. One was the Areopagus, a council made up largely of men who had held senior magistracies. Ephialtes attacked its wide supervisory powers in 462/1 BCE, transferring much of that authority to the citizen council, the assembly and the courts. The Areopagus retained more limited judicial and religious responsibilities. Later ancient accounts differ over parts of the settlement, but agree on its broad political effect: former officeholders could no longer oversee public affairs with the same freedom as before.
Pericles rose to prominence during the following decades, when participation in the courts became easier for citizens of modest means. The ancient constitutional account, chapter 27 attributes to him the introduction of pay for jury service. Such compensation was small, yet a man who lost a day’s earnings by sitting on a jury might otherwise be unable to serve at all. It therefore reduced the advantage of citizens who could afford leisure. Jury pay increased from two to three obols by the later fifth century, while payment for other public duties developed on different schedules.

The democracy widened participation among male citizens even as it drew a stricter boundary around citizenship. In 451/0 BCE, a law associated with Pericles required a person to have two Athenian parents to qualify. Poor citizen men could enjoy political rights that resident foreigners, enslaved people and women did not possess. Women had important roles in households, property transmission, religious festivals and certain priesthoods, but they could not vote in the assembly or sit on the council or political juries. The meaning of demos, the citizen people in whose name the government acted, was therefore much narrower than the population living under its laws.
The kleroterion and the practical work of choosing jurors
Jury selection by lot used equipment called the kleroterion, a stone slab cut with rows of narrow slots for identification tickets. Coloured balls released from a tube beside the slab determined which rows of names were chosen. Random allocation made it harder to arrange appointments in advance, though it could not make every citizen equally available or willing to serve. These slabs and their associated tokens are useful archaeological evidence for democratic procedure, independent of ancient speeches praising the political system.
The chapters 63 onward of the Constitution of the Athenians give our fullest ancient description of juror eligibility and the complicated arrangements for assigning citizens to courts. Sterling Dow examined the surviving machinery and the attempt to reconstruct its workings in “Aristotle, the Kleroteria, and the Courts.” The device was never proof that Athenian selection was immune to interference, and procedures described for one period cannot automatically be assumed for every other century. The slab helps explain how the Athenians allocated civic duties among citizens and put selection by lot into daily practice.
Ostracism and the danger of excessive influence
The Athenians had a separate procedure for removing a politically dangerous figure without convicting him of a crime. First the assembly decided whether an ostracism should take place. If the vote was authorised, citizens wrote the name of a person on a pottery fragment, an ostrakon. The chosen man had to leave Athens for ten years but normally kept his possessions and civic standing. The measure reflected anxiety that a powerful individual might establish a new tyranny. Although ancient writers connect ostracism with the political order established after Cleisthenes, the first documented instance dates to 487 BCE.
An ostracism did not happen automatically every year, nor was the process free from factional politics. Leaders could try to turn it against their rivals. Scholars still dispute whether its six-thousand-vote requirement meant a minimum number of votes cast in total or that the leading candidate had to reach that figure. Potsherds recovered from Athens provide an unusually direct view of the practice. Mabel Lang’s Athenian Agora volume Ostraka (1990) records more than a thousand pieces from the Agora, as well as a group of 191 sherds found on the Acropolis’ northern slope. Nearly all of those 191 bore the name of Themistocles.

A relatively small number of hands wrote the inscriptions on several of the sherds naming Themistocles. Some were evidently prepared before they were cast, but their purpose remains open to interpretation. They could indicate coordinated political campaigning, assistance to voters who could not write or even the sale of ready-inscribed pieces. Whatever the explanation, the fragments show how rivalries and unequal literacy could affect a safeguard intended to curb an individual’s excessive power.
Democracy and the Athenian naval empire
Athens’ growing democracy developed alongside an increasingly powerful navy. At Salamis in 480 BCE, a coalition of Greek ships defeated the invading Persians near Athens. The Greek victory on land at Plataea in 479 BCE helped bring that invasion to an end. Athens then led a new naval alliance, formed in 478/7 BCE, that continued operations against Persia. Some participating cities contributed ships; others paid money. Athens consequently maintained much of the fighting fleet and gained increasing control over resources originally pooled for the war against Persia.

The image above was painted in the nineteenth century, long after the Battle of Salamis. It was produced in 1858 by Wilhelm von Kaulbach, as recorded in Aix-Marseille University’s image catalogue, and should be read as a later artist’s interpretation rather than a contemporary record of the battle.
This alliance became known as the Delian League because its treasury was first kept on the island of Delos. Over time it took on the character of an Athenian empire. Cities that attempted to leave could face military punishment, and surviving inscriptions record tribute paid by allied communities. In 454 BCE the treasury was moved to Athens. When work on the Parthenon began in 447 BCE, it formed part of a building programme closely associated with Pericles. Allied payments and other imperial resources entered the larger financial picture, but the temple cannot accurately be described as paid for entirely out of tribute: Athenian public and sacred funds were involved, and contemporaries disputed how transfers were used and justified. The history and construction of the Parthenon belongs within this complicated relationship between imperial income and Athenian civic projects.
The city’s poorer male citizens gained a particular stake in this naval empire. Men of the thetes class rowed the triremes, earning pay and acquiring practical military importance without needing the expensive armour of wealthier infantrymen. Their naval service strengthened their position within democratic politics. For Greek communities compelled to obey Athens, that same fleet was an instrument of domination. The growth of empire also sharpened the rivalry between Athens and Sparta, drawing Athens toward a war in which both its overseas power and its domestic constitution would come under pressure.
The Peloponnesian War and the decision to invade Sicily
In 431 BCE fighting began between Athens and Sparta and their allied states. Sparta was the foremost land power of the Peloponnese, while Athens depended on its warships, the harbour at Piraeus and the Long Walls that secured a route from the city to the coast. Pericles advised against meeting Spartan infantry in an open battle. His plan was to keep Athens supplied by sea and strike enemy coasts with the fleet. Large numbers of rural inhabitants consequently took shelter within the walls. Conditions became overcrowded, and an epidemic began in 430 BCE. Pericles died in 429 BCE during later outbreaks, depriving the city of a commanding political figure while the war was still far from settled.

The opposing powers tried to end the fighting in 421 BCE with the Peace of Nicias, but mistrust and disputes involving their allies prevented a lasting settlement. In 415 BCE the Athenian assembly approved a campaign in Sicily, far to the west of mainland Greece. Its stated purposes included helping Egesta in a dispute with Selinus and supporting the displaced population of Leontini. Other supporters hoped to undermine Syracuse and extend Athenian influence in the western Greek world. In Thucydides, book 6, the debate includes warnings from Nicias. He argued that the distance, size and military resources of Sicily made the proposal much more dangerous than its advocates allowed.
The assembly first voted to provide sixty ships. Nicias then pressed for a much larger expedition, partly in the hope that the scale of the commitment would change the public’s mind. The citizens gave their generals authority to gather what they thought they needed. Thucydides records that the assembled force at Corcyra included 134 triremes, 5,100 heavy infantry and numerous transports and support vessels. Those figures require care: allied ships and Athenian vessels did not all come from the same source. Lee Brice’s Oxford Handbook study of the Sicilian campaign is among the modern studies that distinguish the initial Athenian allocation from allied contributions. Treating the entire fleet as ships supplied by Athens alone would distort the expedition’s scale and organisation.
Before the expedition sailed, Athenians discovered that the herms, religious monuments depicting Hermes with a prominent head and phallic shaft, had been mutilated during the night. They stood in both public and private spaces, and the damage caused alarm about sacrilege and political conspiracy. Alcibiades, one of the three commanders, came under suspicion. He sailed with the force but was later recalled to face trial and escaped to Sparta instead. Another general, Lamachus, was killed during the campaign. Nicias, who had argued against the invasion, was left directing operations as Syracuse gathered support and strengthened its defences.
The Athenians began a siege of Syracuse but never closed the ring around the city. Gylippus, a Spartan officer, arrived and helped the Syracusans organise their resistance. Repeated fighting and failed attempts to escape by sea culminated in the expedition’s destruction in 413 BCE. During the retreat many Athenian survivors were taken prisoner; Nicias and Demosthenes, the remaining commanders, were put to death. Thucydides describes the dreadful conditions of captives held in the Syracusan stone quarries. Athens had sacrificed soldiers, trained rowing crews, considerable money and the confidence of its allies. Oligarchic opponents could now point to the assembly’s decision to invade Sicily as an example of popular government putting the state itself at risk.
The first overthrow of democracy: the Four Hundred in 411 BCE
The democracy survived the defeat in Sicily, but its opponents took advantage of the emergency. A determined group of oligarchs seized on the emergency, the dissatisfaction of wealthy Athenians and the prospect of Persian financial aid to change the constitution. In 411 BCE they installed a ruling council of Four Hundred. They promised that a larger group of Five Thousand citizens would have a place in government, although at first that body existed chiefly as a claim rather than a functioning institution. Intimidation and violence kept democratic opposition at bay. The ancient Constitution, chapter 29 explains how advocates of the coup used military reverses and the hope that Persia would be more willing to deal with an oligarchy to justify their actions.
The new government immediately faced resistance from the Athenian fleet stationed at Samos. Its soldiers and sailors refused to accept the Four Hundred and continued to support democratic commanders. The oligarchs could not reliably command the most important force on which the city depended. Their council collapsed after only a few months. An interim government followed, and democracy was restored in the next year. A limited political faction had displaced the democracy through violence and intimidation amid a military emergency.
The restored democracy nevertheless encountered a serious failure of its legal restraints. After the naval victory at Arginusae in 406 BCE, bad weather and confused operations prevented crews from rescuing men left among the wrecks. Public anger led to six generals being tried together and sentenced to death in proceedings widely regarded as unlawful. Xenophon says Socrates, then serving on the presiding council, resisted the proposed illegal procedure. Ancient accounts leave room to debate the responsibility of particular speakers and officials. Fear and grief after the battle had helped push the citizen body into overriding legal safeguards it had already established.
The Thirty, civil war and democratic restoration in 403 BCE
The decisive military defeat came the following year. In 405 BCE Lysander, the Spartan commander, destroyed most of the Athenian fleet at Aegospotami near the Hellespont. Those straits connected Athens to grain supplies from the Black Sea, so losing naval control threatened the city’s food supply. Athens surrendered in 404 BCE. Its walls were pulled down and its remaining naval power severely restricted. Under Spartan pressure, a committee subsequently remembered as the Thirty took charge. Its members were Athenians, supported by collaborators at home and Spartan soldiers, rather than officials imported to administer the defeated city.
The Thirty reduced political rights to a favoured minority. They disarmed opponents, confiscated property and killed those they regarded as enemies. Lysias, an orator from Athens’ resident-foreigner community, later recounted how his brother Polemarchus had been murdered and the family’s possessions taken. Ancient authors report extensive executions, although their totals cannot be accepted as independently verified demographic figures. The regime’s brutality also turned people against it who had not necessarily supported every feature of the earlier democracy.
Resistance took organised form in 403 BCE. Exiles led by Thrasybulus secured a position at Phyle before advancing toward Piraeus, Athens’ harbour. Fighting around the city and disagreement among the Spartan leaders helped make a negotiated end to the conflict possible. The democracy returned, accompanied by a settlement that barred renewed prosecutions for most acts committed during the struggle. It nevertheless made specified exceptions for leading members of the oligarchic government. Xenophon and the ancient constitutional account, chapter 40 record both the reconciliation and the effort to make the agreement stick.
The amnesty addressed a practical danger: without limits on reprisals, Athenians might continue fighting their civil war through the courts. It could not restore trust at once or remove all political hostility. Socrates was tried and executed in 399 BCE after being charged with impiety and corrupting young men, a case whose wider political implications remain disputed. His prosecution was not an official exception to the amnesty for offences under the Thirty: the charges were separate, even if the trial took place in a community still unsettled by its recent experiences.
How the restored democracy changed its laws
After 403 BCE the Athenians did more than bring back the institutions that had existed before the coups. They revised their laws and drew a clearer distinction between standing nomoi, or laws, and particular decrees voted by the assembly. Specially appointed citizen panels became part of the process for altering laws, limiting the power of a single assembly decision to set aside established rules. A public action known as a graphe paranomon allowed citizens to challenge decrees as unlawful. These procedures could themselves be used in political struggles, but they offered a way to contest a proposal on legal grounds rather than depending entirely on the majority at a particular meeting.
Federica Carugati and Josiah Ober emphasise the importance of this settlement in their 2024 chapter “Democratic Collapse and Recovery in Ancient Athens (413–403)”. They connect the democracy’s earlier collapse to military disaster and organised oligarchic violence, while arguing that the reforms after the civil war helped people with competing interests accept common political rules. Carugati and Ober are interpreting the settlement from a modern historical perspective. The surviving evidence does not show that Athenians in 403 BCE described their decisions in precisely those terms.
Written records helped make the revised procedures usable. The Metroon, a building in the Agora, served as a repository for public documents and laws. No surviving ruin can tell us the details of every archival routine, but inscriptions and written testimony show how heavily the city depended on records. Excavations in the Agora have uncovered juror identification tickets, voting equipment and ostraka, allowing historians to compare objects used in civic life with descriptions in ancient texts. The American School of Classical Studies at Athens preserves the relevant excavation records and collections.
The restored city also paid citizens for attendance at the assembly in the fourth century, making a day’s political service more feasible for men who worked. The assembly met roughly forty times a year, while courts, magistrates and council committees kept public business moving between meetings. Athenians depended on archives, formal laws, recurring administrative procedures, trained workers including enslaved public servants and a citizen body able to devote considerable time to government.
Why democracy finally lost its independence in 322 BCE
Athens recovered its democracy after the war with Sparta, but military independence remained uncertain in a Greek world where stronger kingdoms could intervene. At Chaeronea in 338 BCE, Philip II of Macedon defeated the combined forces of Athens and Thebes and established Macedonian dominance over mainland Greece. The Athenian assembly and courts remained active, although the city had far less freedom in foreign policy. The military occupation of Munychia in Piraeus belongs to a later episode. Macedonian troops did not establish that garrison immediately after Chaeronea; it followed Athens’ defeat in 322 BCE.
When Alexander the Great died in 323 BCE, Athenians helped lead a coalition against Macedonian control in the conflict known as the Lamian War. The insurgents initially enjoyed some success before suffering defeat. Antipater, the Macedonian regent, then required a property qualification for political rights, excluding many poorer Athenian men, and stationed troops at Munychia. Athens no longer governed as an independent classical democracy. The sequence, including the constitutional settlement that followed, is treated in Oxford’s Athens After Empire and the Cambridge Ancient History.
The date 322 BCE should not be read as the moment every democratic practice vanished. Under the later Hellenistic kingdoms, Athens experienced further constitutional upheavals and periods when democracy was restored. Such restorations took place under the shadow of outside rulers and their military garrisons. Robin Waterfield follows these later changes in his study of the democratic spirit of Hellenistic Athens. What ended in 322 BCE was the sovereignty of the classical democratic system, rather than all Athenian experience of democratic institutions.
The fourth-century government described in the Constitution of the Athenians had developed detailed rules for assigning jurors, reviewing magistrates, handing a presiding office to a citizen for a single day and separating laws from decrees. Many of those rules grew out of political failures and civil violence, not from one reformer’s original design. Surviving allotment devices, voting objects and constitutional accounts show Athenians continually adjusting the machinery by which their citizens ruled. This democracy gave an unusually large share of authority to those recognised as citizens, yet relied on imperial power, excluded most people living in Attica and remained vulnerable to oligarchs within the city and armies beyond it.









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