Matchlock firearms were widespread in Japan long before the Tokugawa shogunate was founded in 1603. They had helped powerful warlords defeat their rivals, equipped large infantry forces during the invasions of Korea, and become familiar weapons in the wars that ended a century of internal conflict. Later accounts nevertheless describe Tokugawa Japan as having set aside firearms in favour of the sword.
Japan’s early modern rulers strictly regulated the manufacture and use of firearms. They sought to stop rival armies from forming and to bring armed disputes under official control. Demand for new guns also declined as major wars became rare. No nationwide prohibition removed firearms from Japanese society. Samurai continued to possess them, village officials recorded them, and hunters used them throughout the Edo period.
The persistence of firearms matters to any explanation of Tokugawa peace. Armed conflict subsided even though guns remained in circulation. The laws and local records instead describe officials trying to decide who could have weapons, what they could do with them, and when their use would be punished. Those concerns grew directly out of the warfare of sixteenth-century Japan.
How Portuguese Matchlocks Reached Japan
A Japanese account written in 1606 dates the arrival of a foreign vessel at Tanegashima, an island south of Kyushu, to 1543. Two Portuguese passengers carried firearms. The island’s young lord, Tanegashima Tokitaka, took an interest in them, purchased the weapons, and had local craftsmen make copies. The matchlock arquebus consequently acquired the Japanese name tanegashima.
The account, Teppōki (“Account of Firearms”), was written by the Buddhist scholar Nanpo Bunshi more than sixty years after the supposed landing. Nanpo gave precise dates and described the visitors communicating through written Chinese, although he had not witnessed the landing. Portuguese authors tell versions that differ in important details. Nor did gunpowder arrive in East Asia only in 1543: Chinese and maritime networks had already circulated firearms and explosive weapons. The distinctive development after Tanegashima was the rapid spread of a portable matchlock suited to regular military use.

Historian Susan Tsumura has examined the dating and composition of the Teppōki. Tsumura finds that the text’s cyclical dating may point to a record made in 1543 and later used by Nanpo. She nevertheless warns that the vessel in the Japanese account cannot automatically be identified with the voyage described by Portuguese writers. The familiar names and circumstances attached to the first landing remain less certain than the standard story implies.
A matchlock arquebus was loaded through its muzzle. The gunner poured powder into the barrel, followed it with a lead ball, and fired by bringing a burning match cord into contact with priming powder. Reloading was slow, smoke obscured the battlefield, and a force needed continuing supplies of powder and lead. Well-trained groups could nevertheless deliver destructive fire. Japan had the metalworkers and trading networks required to reproduce the weapon and supply those who carried it.
Japanese workshops soon made barrels and firing mechanisms themselves, reducing the need for imported European weapons. Important gunmaking communities developed at the trading city of Sakai near Osaka, at Kunitomo in Omi Province, and around the armed religious community at Negoro. Production and adoption differed from place to place. Within several decades, Japanese armourers were supplying armies with a weapon introduced through maritime trade.
Guns in the Wars That Unified Japan
In the Sengoku period, regional military lords, or daimyo, struggled for territory, tax revenues and political authority. A lord who acquired arquebuses also needed trained soldiers, lead, powder, repairs and the money to sustain all of them. Guns joined armies already composed of mounted warriors and infantry with bows and spears. As those armies expanded, foot soldiers known as ashigaru played an increasingly substantial part in their campaigns.
Japanese commanders used firearms in sieges and open battles well before Nagashino in 1575. Armed Buddhist religious communities employed them too. At Nagashino, Oda Nobunaga and his ally Tokugawa Ieyasu fought Takeda Katsuyori’s army behind prepared barriers. Their positions allowed gunners to operate during the attacks. The Takeda forces suffered a heavy defeat, and guns became one of the most remembered features of the battle.

The standard retelling describes three thousand arquebusiers arranged in three ranks, firing perfectly timed volleys while successive ranks reloaded. Earlier evidence does not securely establish that drill. The Shinchō Kōki, a chronicle written by Nobunaga’s retainer Ōta Gyūichi, names officers commanding a force of about one thousand guns but gives no account of the celebrated rotating ranks. Other allied units also had firearms, so that figure need not cover every matchlock present. The total numbers and precise tactics remain debated; Arturo Galindo García’s 2026 study of Japanese firearms explains why the familiar volley-fire reconstruction is uncertain.
The victory at Nagashino did not depend on the rotating-volley story being accurate. Nobunaga and Ieyasu benefited from defensive barriers, terrain and coordinated troops, including gunners. The defeat also reflected decisions taken by the Takeda command. Mounted warriors and swords did not become useless overnight, and Nagashino was far from Japan’s first substantial deployment of firearms.
Subsequent fighting leaves little doubt about the arquebus’s place in Japanese armies. After Nobunaga’s death, Toyotomi Hideyoshi carried forward the struggle for unification and invaded Korea in 1592 and again in 1597. His infantry used matchlocks extensively until the campaigns ended in 1598. At Sekigahara in 1600, when Tokugawa Ieyasu’s coalition confronted its rivals, numerous daimyo fielded large contingents of arquebusiers. The men who established Tokugawa government were themselves veterans of gunpowder warfare.
Hideyoshi’s Sword Hunt Was About Political Control
Hideyoshi ordered a major disarmament before the Tokugawa shogunate existed. In 1588 he instructed officials to collect weapons from farmers. The katanagari, or sword hunt, covered much more than swords: it named short swords, bows, spears and guns. Hideyoshi argued that armed cultivators might rebel, abandon their farming responsibilities, and obstruct the yearly agricultural levy collected by their lords.
The surviving edict in English translation, published by Columbia University’s Asia for Educators, explicitly connects the confiscation of weapons to the collection of taxes. Hideyoshi needed cultivators to remain on their land and produce the rice and other revenues that supported warrior households. The order also announced that the surrendered blades would be used to construct a great Buddhist image. The promise provided a religious purpose for an otherwise coercive policy, whose political and fiscal objectives remained clear.
Enforcement varied from village to village. The edict cannot establish that every village gave up every firearm, and provisions about the later use of confiscated weapons emphasize swords and short swords. Domain records show continued rural gun ownership, often justified by hunting and the need to defend fields against animals. Hideyoshi was seeking a firmer division between rulers who bore arms and farmers who cultivated the land; that effort never meant the complete disappearance of weapons from rural communities.
During the wars, villagers had sometimes resisted authority with arms, while military service offered some men a way to rise in status. Hideyoshi worked to replace that fluid arrangement with more clearly defined occupations and obligations. Alongside confiscation came land surveys, tax measures, rules about status, and greater control over conflict between domains. Together these measures were intended to make warfare by regional groups harder to undertake without permission.
Why the Tokugawa Shoguns Tightened the Rules
After winning at Sekigahara in 1600, Tokugawa Ieyasu was appointed shogun in 1603. Among the powerful daimyo on whom his rule depended were former enemies, men who still possessed soldiers and weapons. The new bakufu, or shogunate, therefore had good reason to supervise potential rivals. Ieyasu’s armies eliminated the Toyotomi family’s last stronghold at Osaka in 1615, yet control over the armed followers and resources of other lords remained a continuing political problem.

Tokugawa rulers used several measures to constrain the daimyo. The government restricted castle building and monitored daimyo marriages and alliances. Under the seventeenth-century system of sankin-kōtai, or alternate attendance, lords were required to spend time at Edo and make costly journeys between the shogunal capital and their domains. Their retainers and families became bound to an arrangement that discouraged military independence. The shogunate’s rise over Japan’s imperial court provides further background to the concentration of effective military government in hereditary warrior hands rather than the imperial administration.
An independently maintained arsenal could still provide the foundation for rebellion. Officials consequently sought to monitor gunsmiths, ammunition and the movement of weapons. They were also concerned about rōnin, masterless warriors who had lost the lords who employed them. Armed men without a place in the new political order were a more direct danger than a registered matchlock kept by a farming family.
The Shimabara-Amakusa rebellion of 1637–1638 showed how much armed resistance the new government could still face. In western Kyushu, oppressive taxation and other grievances combined with the persecution of Christian communities to produce a revolt and prolonged siege. The rebels fought with firearms, while the shogunate deployed guns and artillery to crush them at terrible human cost. The fighting showed both the government’s capacity to mobilize an army and the persistence of weapons beyond its direct control. Officials became more anxious about armed groups and people moving outside established authority.
What Was Actually Restricted?
One early manufacturing measure dates to 1607, when Tokugawa officials tried to concentrate authorized gunmaking around Nagahama in Omi Province. They placed production and sales under supervision and discouraged craftsmen from transferring their skills to other domains. Official orders and inspections offered another way to monitor the supply. A gun made for the shogunate posed a different political risk from a gun freely sold to a daimyo building up his own forces.
Despite those restrictions, workshops kept producing firearms. Sakai remained a prominent centre, and seventeenth-century orders survive in its records. Galindo García’s research follows a gradual fall in production and in the number of craftsmen as demand shrank. Sakai still had working gunsmiths late in the 1600s, although their numbers dropped sharply by the early eighteenth century. Official oversight reduced opportunities for independent manufacture, while the end of major campaigns reduced the number of weapons anyone wanted to buy.
Falling production still left large numbers of firearms in circulation. Authorities still bought firearms, military households maintained stores of them, and gunsmiths repaired older matchlocks. Without constant campaigning, armies no longer needed to replace large numbers of lost or worn weapons. Some craftsmen could find more reliable work in other kinds of metalworking. Shrinking orders tell us about the conditions of peacetime commerce; they do not show that every household repudiated guns on moral grounds.
Possession and use were regulated differently across the country and across the Edo period. Ordinances might prohibit shooting around Edo, govern hunters’ weapons, require registrations, or investigate guns kept without approval. Officials separated uses against animals from firearms intended for fighting people. Later accounts sometimes combine these separate rules into a supposed national prohibition. The records show officials revising particular restrictions over time as their concerns changed.

The Village Guns That Never Disappeared
Village records offer especially direct evidence that Edo Japan remained an armed society. Officials listed guns precisely because local people held them and because responsibility for their use had to be assigned. Mountain settlements and farming villages needed to drive away or kill wild boar and deer that ate crops. Firearms were also useful for hunting animals that supplied food or an income.
Some surviving village inventories record hundreds or thousands of firearms. Historian Tamara Enomoto, drawing on Japanese archival scholarship, reports a Kumamoto domain survey recording 1,630 firearms among villagers in 1634 and 2,173 in 1641. In mountainous Shiiba, an inventory from 1745 found 436 guns in 955 households, rising to 586 by 1836. None of these figures is a countrywide census. They are enough, however, to disprove a picture in which firearms had become unknown among ordinary Japanese people.
Records from Matsumoto domain in 1687 provide another measure of rural ownership. According to Enomoto, cultivators possessed more than one thousand guns, while the warrior class held about two hundred. These were administrative categories: a weapon licensed to guard a crop was not thereby available for a feud, and each domain might record possession differently. Even with those cautions, the figures show authorities acknowledging widespread rural ownership rather than reserving all guns for samurai.
Ownership carried obligations. A villager might have to register a gun, ask permission before repairing it, report that someone else had taken responsibility for it, or borrow a firearm from a domain store. A hunting permit did not entitle its holder to settle a boundary quarrel by shooting at a neighbour. Some villages watched over which residents could be trusted with guns and could withdraw permission. Using local communities to enforce the rules was practical when settlements were scattered and officials could not supervise every household.
Widespread rural ownership coexisted with relatively limited armed fighting between villages because the authorities distinguished possession from permitted use. Officials claimed jurisdiction over land and water disputes and punished armed fighting harshly. Village leaders risked collective penalties if they let conflicts escalate. Many matchlocks therefore served as tools for protecting harvests rather than as weapons carried into private wars, although they were plainly capable of both uses.
Hunters, Licenses and the Fear of Armed Outsiders
The authorities revised firearm controls as their concerns changed. In the Kantō region around Edo, fears of banditry and discontent among masterless warriors led to tighter restrictions during the mid-seventeenth century. Measures in the 1650s and 1660s targeted unauthorized guns while accepting hunting and crop protection as legitimate uses. Later officials called for licenses and information about concealed weapons. Where no licensed hunter was available, some settlements received permission to borrow firearms.
Tokugawa Tsunayoshi, shogun from 1680 to 1709, promoted the protection of living creatures and tried to curb forms of violence, policies that affected hunting and gun use unevenly across domains. The government changed course under his successor Yoshimune, who became shogun in 1716. Officials gave renewed attention to the practical need to protect farmland. Depending on the policy of the moment, permission to frighten animals with gunfire might be distinguished from permission to kill them.
Bureaucratic rules could also encourage concealment. A cultivator whose matchlock broke might need approval before obtaining repairs or a replacement. Difficult permissions made unregistered guns attractive, and officials periodically searched for concealed weapons in the early nineteenth century. Repeated discoveries showed how imperfect government supervision remained: some households continued to keep firearms outside official registers.
By the 1840s, fear of robbery and disorder had given village firearms a new defensive purpose. Villages sometimes wanted to defend themselves against armed gangs, while officials struggled to distinguish legitimate protection from the revival of independent fighting groups. The historian David L. Howell’s study of the social life of firearms follows this change in outlook: a gun long classified chiefly as an agricultural implement could again be used openly against human attackers.
The Samurai Did Not Regard Every Gun as Dishonorable
The sources likewise offer little support for the claim that samurai universally regarded firearms as dishonourable. Swords acquired powerful significance as marks of warrior status, and martial schools cultivated swordsmanship. Yet the armies of the unification period had relied heavily on matchlocks. Later samurai could prize the sword without rejecting firearms that their predecessors had used in battle.
Marksmanship itself remained part of Edo-period martial training. Schools passed down shooting techniques; matchlocks appeared at ceremonies and among the armed attendants of daimyo. The Tokugawa family also included gunfire in ritual observances. Galindo García records that Tokugawa Hidetada began the New Year practice of a ceremonial first shooting, teppō hajime, in 1620. Firearms plainly retained an accepted place in warrior culture.
Organized hunts gave shoguns and daimyo another opportunity to display authority. By directing groups of armed hunters, a lord could exercise command and exhibit military skill while the country was at peace. A matchlock used by a farmer to protect fields from a boar served an agricultural purpose; the same weapon in a daimyo’s procession signalled status and military rank. The owner’s social rank helped determine the gun’s purpose and status.
Legal privileges reinforced these differences in status. Samurai and domain governments enjoyed privileges unavailable to most villagers, and restrictions on carrying weapons made ranks visible in everyday life. Supervised gunmaking also made it harder for a daimyo to stockpile new weapons unnoticed. Tokugawa policy controlled who could use violence and organize armed men; it never required all matchlocks to be replaced with swords.
Peace Changed the Market for Weapons
With no more civil wars on the scale of the Sengoku conflicts, demand for military firearms fell. After Osaka and Shimabara, regional lords had little need to order matchlocks in wartime quantities. Gunsmiths remained active, but fewer customers wanted large stocks of military firearms. Existing guns could be repaired and passed from one generation to the next. Elaborate decoration on some surviving examples shows that they could be valued as possessions and products of skilled craftsmanship as well as weapons.

While Edo expanded and commercial and agricultural production increased, the shogunate preserved peace through institutions far broader than firearm regulation. It supervised castles and domain finances, placed obligations on the great lords, and watched over the movement of their households. Villages settled many disputes locally; domain officials stepped in when trouble threatened public order. Controls on firearms formed one part of this political system, rather than explaining its stability on their own.
Japan also maintained contact with other countries. The curbs on Christianity and European merchants during the 1630s were severe, culminating in the expulsion of the Portuguese, but Dutch and Chinese trade continued at Nagasaki. Japan maintained diplomatic and commercial ties involving Korea, the Ryukyu Kingdom and communities in the northern borderlands. Limits on trade and the rarity of large wars affected demand for new military equipment. Technical knowledge did not disappear with those restrictions.
Surviving weapons, village registers and workshop papers document the continued presence of firearms throughout Tokugawa peace. Guns remained available for regulated activities and were still manufactured, although they served different purposes and improvements in small-arms technology were uneven. Japanese artisans retained practical knowledge and could investigate designs brought from abroad.
From Matchlocks to Modern Rifles
By the early nineteenth century, European and American forces possessed weapons far beyond the traditional matchlock. Japanese scholars and officials learned about some of these developments through Dutch contacts and the study of Western science, known as rangaku. Kunitomo Tōbei, also called Ikkansai, investigated a European air gun and explained how to construct and operate it in his Kihōki in 1819. The book survives as direct evidence of technical experiment in the Edo period.
Surviving matchlocks also provide physical evidence of continued manufacture. An eighteenth-century gun inscribed by Enamiya Sakubei in the Metropolitan Museum of Art shows that Japanese matchlocks were still being made in the eighteenth century. A surviving object cannot establish national production totals or the frequency of actual use, but it disproves the claim that gunmaking ceased around 1600.
Commodore Matthew Perry’s American warships confronted the shogunate in 1853 with modern artillery and the threat of force. Japanese authorities faced pressure to open ports and conclude agreements under conditions of obvious naval inequality. Japanese forces still possessed firearms, but their equipment and military organization lagged behind the fleets confronting them. Both the shogunate and regional domains acquired modern weapons, drilled new troops and reorganized forces in the years before Tokugawa rule collapsed.
Japanese forces fought one another with rifles and artillery during the upheavals of the Meiji Restoration in 1868. The new government replaced hereditary warrior service with conscription and changed the military institutions that had governed earlier centuries. The Meiji government instead issued its own regulations for civilian firearm ownership. Enomoto explains that regulations issued in 1872 limited civilian possession of military-style firearms but allowed licensed ownership, while the sword edict of 1876 mainly restricted public sword-carrying outside authorized services.
Japan’s modern firearms restrictions developed through legislation long after the Tokugawa period. Edo-period rulers had concentrated on preventing unauthorized warfare while permitting controlled gun ownership and use. They restricted arsenals, supervised armed retainers and made the settlement of conflict a function of government. Firearms remained in households, workshops and official stores throughout the period. Japan’s long Tokugawa peace was achieved with guns still present.









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